

## DISCIPLINE OF ANDREW U. D. STRAW

### Exoneration Calling Indiana Discipline a “Drive-by Shooting”

1. *In the Matter of Andrew U. D. Straw*, [17-000-108746](#) (VSB Disciplinary Board, 6/20/2017) – 3-judge panel exoneration
2. VSB suggested my lawsuits and pleadings were not totally frivolous and refused to discipline me.
3. My statement about **Court Abuse of the term Frivolous**:  
<http://frivolous.andrewstraw.com>

### Drive-by shooting Indiana discipline. ([Complaint](#); [Answers](#); [Affidavit](#))

1. *In Re Straw*, [68 N.E.3d 1070](#) (Ind. 2/14/2017) – 180 day susp.  
*In the Matter of Andrew U. D. Straw*, 98S00-1601-DI-00012 (Ind. 2/14/2017) As of 3/14/2020, suspension is up to **3 years, 1 month**.
2. Disciplinary Commission first offered a **non-punitive “disability status”** and when this was rejected, sought very harsh discipline: 180 days of suspension. This was expanded to **3 years of suspension with no hearing justifying the additional 2.5+ years** because the Indiana Supreme Court will not respond to any motions that I make in this disciplinary case.

3. Mitigating factors include the total lack of all other discipline since I was first admitted to practice law in 1999 through 2/14/2017. At the time I was disciplined, I was admitted to practice law at the state or federal level in 8 states. Then I lost that status in 3 states (5 law licenses suspended indefinitely) because of the Indiana attack.
4. The Indiana Supreme Court hearing officer was conflicted in many different ways. *See, e.g., Straw v. U.S. District Court, et. al.*, 20-1352 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir.). He was a candidate for an Indiana Supreme Court vacancy while he was the hearing officer appointed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Prior to this he was a clerk for several 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit judges, including a former chief judge. Then, while sitting on my hearing officer report for 6 months past its deadline in the rules, Hon. Ahler applied for a bankruptcy judge position to be appointed by the 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Judicial Council. Then, I sued him and the federal trial judge, chief judge of the district, Hon. Magnus-Stinson, dismissed the case against the Indiana hearing officer while also sitting on the same 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit Council that was considering hiring Hon. Ahler to be a federal judge. Then, on appeal at the 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit,

Hon. Ahler was hired by my trial judge, the members of my panel against Ahler, and the 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit as a whole. He was protected and my appeal against him denied. One of my panel members first voted to reject my appeal against Hon. Ahler the Indiana hearing officer and then *recused* because Ahler was his clerk. Ahler would not allow me to make a motion to dismiss or other dispositive motions even with my answer and 35-page affidavit refuting every allegation in the verified complaint. Ahler hardly mentioned my extensive defensive pleadings in his hearing officer report. Ahler was rewarded for cooperating with the discipline by being hired as a federal judge for 14 years and paid millions of dollars, while I was deprived of justice against him.

5. Ahler was aware of the **offer to not punish me** but instead to impose a **disability status**. Despite this, he recommended severe punishment and suspension.
6. While Indiana's Hon. Ahler was a **single conflicted hearing officer** with no *bona fide* hearing (*in-absentia*) when he recommended such severe punishment, the Virginia State Bar provided an actual hearing with **3 unconflicted judges** and the VSB stated that I would

not be punished in Virginia for the same behavior and my lawsuits were not “totally frivolous.” There was a case in Virginia on precisely this Rule 3.1 issue and if the lawsuit was not “totally frivolous,” Virginia would not impose Rule 3.1 sanctions. *Mosely*. This precedent prompted VSB to exonerate me using the **clear and convincing** evidence standard.

7. The Disciplinary Commission staff, Angie Ordway, admitted officially and on the record that there was *no precedent* for pursuing discipline in a case like mine.
8. Ms. Ordway also admitted that the non-punitive offer was made.
9. <http://dueprocess.andrewstraw.com>

### Drive-by shootings, Reciprocal

1. *Straw v. U.S. District Court*, [17-2523](#) (7<sup>th</sup> Cir.) – no actual hearing is required before losing 4 federal law licenses.
2. *In Re Andrew U. D. Straw*, [1:18-mc-00607-TWP](#) (S.D. Ind.);
3. *In Re Disciplinary Action Andrew U D Straw*, [1:17-mc-00005-TLS](#) (N.D. Ind.);
4. *In the Matter of Andrew Straw, An Attorney*, 1:17-cv-07717 (N.D. Ill.);

5. *Straw v. U.S. District Court, 3:17-cv-00842-JDP (W.D. Wis.)*
6. 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit refused me bar membership because of the Indiana discipline in *Straw v. United States, 16-17573-GG (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 5/22/2019)*, preventing me from representing my family.
7. Avvo.com's profile of me includes the 2017 Indiana discipline. *Straw v. Avvo, 20-cv-294-JLR (W.D. Wa.)*, which I needed to file because Avvo would not pay the arbitration filing fee under its own Terms of Service.

## OTHER LIMITING COURT ACTIONS

I was blocked from making filings at the 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit and the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit and the Northern District of Illinois. The 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit because I made formal objections to discrimination against me and the failure to allow me **bar access to protect my family in the Camp LeJeune poisoning case**. The 7<sup>th</sup> Circuit because **I opposed perjury the courts wished to defend**. I was also blocked from making filings for 1 year at the N. District of Illinois **without any hearing** or any chance to defend myself. I don't even know who my accusers were or who was on the "Executive Committee" who did this to me.

In my experience, Midwest courts and their allies like the Chief Judge of the 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit violate the First Amendment right to use the courts and petition them when you have a complaint. See below.

## **FIRST AMENDMENT: OPEN COURTS RIGHT**

In *Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., Petitioner v. National Labor Relations Board*, [461 U.S. 731](#) (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court said: "In *California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited*, [404 U.S. 508](#), 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972), we recognized that the **right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.**"

*McDonald v. Smith*, 472 U.S. 479, 486 (1985). Petitioning right is "among the most precious" in the Bill of Rights. (J. Brennan concurring)

## LANGUAGE OF DISCRIMINATION INDIANA SUPREME COURT

### Indiana Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Sections 2(c) & 3(b)

prevent any disabled person from being a lawyer. Just read them:

#### Section 2. Grounds for Discipline or Suspension

2(c) Disability. **Any attorney who becomes disabled** by reason of physical or mental illness or infirmity or because of the use of or addiction to intoxicants or drugs **shall be subject to suspension** by reason of the disability.

Section 3. Types of Discipline and Suspension; Notice of Orders and Opinions

3(b) Disability suspension. **Any attorney found disabled** by reason of physical or mental illness or infirmity or by use of or addiction to any intoxicants **shall be suspended indefinitely** for the duration of the disability.

Always nice when your civil rights category is excluded from practicing law and lumped together with alcoholism and drug addiction. Such a rule and its application to me is official crime in Indiana, the crime of civil rights violation. [IC 35-46-2-1](#)